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ABSTRACT 	  
PERCEPTIONS OF HOSPITAL PATIENT SAFETY CULTURE IN  
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS  
STATION 593 SOUTHERN NEVADA 
 
by 
Kimberly Falco, MSN, RN 
Dr. Carolyn Yucha, Examination Committee Chair  
Dean, Schools of Nursing and Allied Health Sciences  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
Opportunities for error exist, adverse events occur, and challenges endure. 
However, patients will continue to experience preventable adverse events unless steps are 
taken. Efforts to improve patient safety are critical to today’s healthcare environment. 
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) believes that the identification of adverse 
events allows for creation of system improvements to increase patient safety.   
Implementing safety culture requires a proper assessment of existing barriers and 
potential challenges. Patient safety culture assessments start by evaluating the current 
patient care environment. This assists the organization in identifying barriers to patient 
safety and in working toward creating a culture of patient safety with improved patient 
outcomes. 
Development of an organizational safety culture improves patient outcomes by 
opening communication, enhancing teamwork and providing a more supportive 
environment. This project assesses staff’s perceptions of patient safety based on scores 
from the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPS). The data gathered in this 
	   	  iv	  
project assists in benchmarking performance and quality improvement projects within the 
VA Southern Nevada. The survey gathered information on general demographics, 
outcome measures and safety culture dimensions that are unit specific and hospital-wide. 
Responses were analyzed utilizing specific software created for the HSOPS. 
The HSOPS results were calculated based on the percent of positive responses to 
the 42 items, which are categorized in patient safety dimensions.  Of the 12 composite 
dimensions handoffs and transitions was identified as the area needing the most 
improvement, with a positive response rate of only 13%, suggesting that 87% of the 
respondents felt this area was problematic. Teamwork across units, and feedback and 
communication regarding errors, were the next lowest scoring segments, at 15% and 
18%, respectively. 
The information gathered from the survey offers a unique opportunity to address 
deficiencies in patient safety culture. Composite level database comparisons to the data 
collected demonstrated a strong need for patient safety process improvements. The results 
are not the end point in this process; it has simply laid the foundation for process 
improvement. This project has outlined the necessary information and process for 
planning a continuous quality improvement initiative. The survey itself is not the 
intervention. Systematic action on an organizational level, including planning and follow-
up, is necessary for a sustainable change to occur. The completion of this project 
represents only the beginning of a continuous quality improvement cycle, to improve the 
culture of patient safety. 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Patient safety culture is the overarching theme involving organization’s individual 
and group values. It incorporates beliefs, behaviors, perceptions and attitudes that 
determine the organization's commitment to safety (Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality [AHRQ], 2011). There is growing evidence that an effective patient safety 
culture is related to decreased incidence and increased reporting of adverse events. 
Successful safety culture improves bidirectional communication between leadership and 
staff, focusing efforts on staff recognizing safety as a necessity (Singer et al., 2009). 
“Safety… depends on achieving a culture of trust, reporting, transparency and discipline” 
(Leape et al., 2009, p. 429). Organizations with an effective integrated safety culture are 
characterized by communication founded on mutual trust. Mutually shared perceptions 
on the importance of safety build confidence in preventative measures and improve their 
efficacy (AHRQ).  
Flawed systems foster an environment in which people are prone to make 
mistakes or fail to prevent them – causing adverse events (Singla, Kitch, Weissman, & 
Campbell, 2006). Colla, Bracken, Kinney, and Weeks (2005) described healthcare as a 
“high hazard industry” because of the inherent risk for morbidity and mortality. This 
understanding has led to expanded interest beyond technical failures and into 
organizational processes, managerial, and human factors, which are the primary causes of 
adverse events (Colla et al.). This has encouraged organizations to concentrate on 
predictive safety measures, including the use of surveys measuring safety culture (Colla 
et al.).  
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Classen et al. (2011) reported findings stating adverse events occurred in one-
third of hospital admissions. Communication and awareness are key elements in the 
culture of patient safety, with documented benefits. However, creating an organizational 
environment where staff supports a culture of safety remains a challenge (Groszek, 
2010). Challenges with promoting a culture of safety are numerous. Discrepancies have 
been documented in medical records reviews, inconsistencies are noted on walking 
rounds, and incident and injury reports raise additional concerns. 
Scope 
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is the nation’s largest integrated health 
system (Singer et al., 2009). The VA has emphasized moving from a punitive local-
hospital system of safety and risk reduction, to a system-integrated patient safety climate 
(Hartmann et al., 2008). Efforts to improve patient safety have included defining a 
common language and establishing baseline parameters and systems of measurement. 
Assessing the current safety culture is essential for understanding potential areas for 
improvement (Hartmann et al.). Specifically, identifying qualities related to patient 
safety, such as teamwork and communication, allows planning for process changes 
directed at improving the quality of care (Singla et al., 2006) 
In 2008, Rivard et al. estimated the impact of preventable patient safety events, as 
identified by Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). This study reviewed 
7.5 million patient records for occurrences of potentially preventable adverse events and 
concluded VA findings are similar to previously published non-VA hospitals (Rivard et 
al.). Despite the system differences between VA and non-VA organizations, AHRQ 
indicators were determined to be applicable within the VA system (Rivard et al.). The 
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findings of Singer et al. (2009) further supported this conclusion. The VA nationally 
integrated hospital network does not possess a stronger safety culture than non-VA 
organizations. 
The VA believes the identification of adverse events will allow for creation of 
system improvements to increase patient safety (West, Weeks, & Bagian, 2008). 
Although uncommon, severe adverse events can be devastating. West et al. (2008) 
identified one specific adverse event “Failure to Rescue” as representing more than 3,000 
deaths within the VA system per year  (p. 262). That is, health care providers failed to 
identify and prevent clinical deterioration of a patient resulting in death or permanent 
disability (AHRQ, 2011).  
Patient safety is a complex issue, which defies simple explanations due to its 
inherent complexity. It can, however, be broken down into the types of occurrences and 
outcomes. Table 1 shows the annual averages of actual cases of adverse events and 
medical errors throughout the VA system over a nine-year period of time and illustrates 
the effect and significance of adverse events. 
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Table 1 
VA Average Annual Adverse Medical Events and Errors for 1997–2005. 
Adverse Event/Error Average Number of Cases 
Annually 
Failure to Rescue 22,090 
Decubitus Ulcer 209,838 
Accidental Puncture or Laceration 453,532 
Postoperative Pulmonary Embolism or Deep 
Vein Thrombosis 
98,100 
Selected Infections Due to Medical Care 336,662 
Postoperative Respiratory Failure 34,844 
Iatrogenic Pneumothorax  427,209 
Postoperative Hemorrhage or Hematoma 98,321 
Postoperative Wound Dehiscence 19,889 
Postoperative Sepsis 18,834 
Postoperative Physiologic or Metabolic 
Derangement 
46,265 
Complications of Anesthesia 98,881 
Postoperative Hip Fracture 71,293 
 Note. (Adapted from West et al., 2008) 
 
Hartmann et al. (2009) suggest there are numerous opportunities for improvement 
in patient safety culture within the VA hospitals. Numerous measures and longitudinal 
examinations of patient safety and outcomes have been undertaken. From 1997 to 2005, 
the rate for Failure to Rescue steadily declined within the VA system. However, West et 
al. (2008) reported that the number of decubitus ulcers, postoperative DVTs and 
accidental punctures or lacerations have shown significant increases (all p<.001). 
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Changing organizational culture presents challenges (Colla, et al., 2005). The 
Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, as well as The Joint Commission's 
Sentinel Event Policy of 1996, encourage ongoing organizational improvements and 
system changes to improve patient safety. This is further supported by The Joint 
Commission requirements for new and ongoing patient safety goals (Leape et al., 2009). 
Classen and colleagues (2011) have reported that adverse events occurred in one-
third of hospital admissions, with varying degrees of severity. Driven by increasing 
amounts of evidence and publicity, numerous health care organizations have initiated 
programs to develop and implement safety practices and to support patient safety 
initiatives (Leape et al., 2009). To improve patient safety, AHRQ (2004) has identified 
and defined 29 specific indicators of patient safety. Supporting a culture of safety and 
quality improvement in our Nation’s healthcare system remains a top priority for the 
AHRQ. For that reason AHRQ (2004) continues to support and underwrites the Hospital 
Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPS). Safety culture surveys assess and measure 
organizational conditions that potentially lead to adverse events and patient harm (Leape 
et al.). Organizations desiring to assess their existing patient safety culture should 
consider conducting a survey (AHRQ, 2011). The HSOPS survey emphasizes 
management and institutional commitment to safety, handoffs and transitions, and 
teamwork (Singla et al., 2006).  
Problem Statement  
Adverse events and medical errors are occurring within the VA Southern Nevada 
Medical Center at Mike O’Callaghan Federal Medical Center (MOFMC) and patients are 
at risk, with sometimes-fatal consequences. Reduction of adverse events within the VA 
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system is a Federal mandate. Based on this, an assessment of the safety culture 
underlying these conditions was warranted. 
Purpose of the Study  
This project examined staff’s perceptions of patient safety culture. This assisted in 
identifying deficiencies to allow for performance improvement and raise organizational 
awareness in building a culture of safety. Identifying these deficiencies allows the 
organization to: 
• Raise staff awareness about patient safety 
• Diagnose and assess the current status of patient safety culture 
• Identify strengths and areas for patient safety culture improvement 
• Examine trends in patient safety culture change over time 
• Evaluate the cultural impact of patient safety initiatives and interventions 
• Conduct internal and external comparisons 
(AHRQ, 2011) 
Research Question 
 What is the staff’s perception of patient safety culture, based on scores using the 
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture, in Mike O’Callaghan Federal Medical Center? 
Definition of Terms 
Study terms are defined as the following: 
• Patient safety culture: the aggregate product of an organization’s individual and 
group values, beliefs, behaviors, perceptions and attitudes that embody the 
organization's commitment to safety. 
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• Adverse event: An untoward and usually unanticipated outcome that occurs in 
association with health care. 
• Error: Mistakes made in the process of care that result in, or have the potential to 
result in, harm to patients. Mistakes include the failure of a planned action to be 
completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim. Can be the 
result of an action that is taken (error of commission) or an action that is not taken 
(error of omission). 
• Staff: Facility Employees who meet one of the following criteria:  
o Directly or indirectly contact or interact with patients but whose work 
directly affects patient care  
§ Such as nursing, physical therapy, nutrition services, pharmacy, 
laboratory, and unit clerks  
o Provide patient care, who spend most of their work hours in the hospital  
§ Emergency department physicians, hospitalists, and pathologists 
o Supervise, manage, or lead the facility  
• Perception: an individual’s personal awareness, feelings, or understanding. For 
the duration of this project it will be defined in relation to the scores derived from 
the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 
(AHRQ, 2004; AHRQ, 2011)  
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Over ten years ago, alarming data on the scope and impact of medical errors in the 
United States called for nationwide efforts to address this problem (Groszek, 2010). 
Efforts to improve patient safety have increased during the past decade. However, 
progress toward improvement has been unacceptably slow (Leape et al., 2009). The 
Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) report To Err is Human was instrumental in bringing forth 
system perspective within the health care environment. System perspective provides a 
method of recognizing situations or processes that contribute to errors and adverse events 
(Groszek). Driven by public concern in 2001, the federal government initiated an 
evaluation of the health care delivery system and its outcomes. 
In 2005 Congress passed The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act to 
support the health care industry’s continued commitment to improve the quality of care, 
reducing errors and adverse events. This statute includes privilege and confidentiality 
protections associated with data collected, shared, and analyzed by covered entities. The 
final rule outlined the development of patient safety organizations to encourage error 
reporting, data analysis, and facilitate sharing of knowledge (Groszek, 2010). In the 
current health care market, a culture of patient safety plays a critical role in the success 
and the delivery of quality health care services (Bellou & Thanopoulos, 2006). The 
effects of quality health care should be understood and developed as a continuum. Health 
care organizations need to manage operations with a goal towards continuous quality 
improvement and a culture of patient safety (Scott, Mannion, Davies, & Marshall, 2003). 
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Public awareness of the prevalence of medical errors and adverse events is 
palpable.  Patients continue to be concerned that they may be harmed when they enter a 
hospital (Leape et al., 2009). Landrigan et al. (2010) studied 10 North Carolina hospitals 
and concluded adverse events and errors remain common with one-fourth of all patients 
being exposed to a potential harmful event.  
Despite the significant investment and efforts to improve patient safety by 
government agencies and regulators the dissemination and implementation of evidence-
based safety practices has been meager at best (Landrigan et al., 2010). Hartmann et al. 
(2008) concluded it is important to understand the level of safety culture in hospitals to 
measure success and plan for improvement. At minimum, high-quality health care should 
not harm patients, particularly through preventable medical errors. The first step in 
reducing the large number of harmful medical events that occur is to analyze both the 
errors themselves and the culture behind them (Hartmann et al.) 
History and Background 
Medical care’s potential to cause harm, has been discussed throughout history. 
The Hippocratic Oath written in late 5th century BC includes abstinence from doing harm 
(Smith, 2005). The term primum non nocere translated to “first, do no harm” was 
introduced to English medical culture by W. Hooker in 1847 along with the principle of 
non-malfeasance (Ilan & Fowler, 2005; Smith, 2005). In 1863 Florence Nightingale 
stated, “It may seem a strange principle to enunciate as the very first requirement in a 
hospital that it should do the sick no harm” (as cited in Smith, C., 2005, p. 373). 
The catalyst for the patient safety movement in health care was the report by the 
IOM - To Err is Human (Groszek, 2010). Although it is not the first publication to 
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systematically address patient safety in healthcare, it stirred immense public attention. 
Health care is a high pace environment. The Institute of Medicine (2001) has examined 
this type of environment and the importance of improving the delivery of health care 
services by identifying the gaps between ideal care and actual care. The report was 
significant in bringing a systems perspective to the health care environment, recognizing 
that humans are fallible and errors will occur. That beyond the individual involved, a 
situation and/or current process has contributed and created the framework causing the 
individual to fail (Groszek).  
The findings by the IOM had a significant impact on health policy debates, 
medical malpractice policy debates, and the decision that patient safety needed to be 
improved in America. Along with summarizing the causes of the problem, the report 
provided recommendations to address interventions on several levels (Ilan & Fowler, 
2005). Congress advised creation of a Center for Patient Safety, which would set goals, 
track progress, develop knowledge, and facilitate legislation. Congress allocated $50 
million in 2001, to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), an agency 
within the Department of Health and Human Services, to develop patient safety and 
improvement programs (Groszek, 2010). 
As Congress passed The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, 
health care organizations worked at improving the quality of care and reducing errors and 
patient harm. Some of the main advantages within this statute are privilege and 
confidentiality protections associated with information collected, shared, and analyzed by 
covered entities. A standardized reporting system was created nationally to organize and 
analyze events that may compromise patient safety. Federal regulations authorized the 
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development of patient safety organizations to encourage error reporting, data analysis, 
and facilitate learning (Groszek, 2010). Recommendations for health care organizations 
and professionals were to established performance standards focused on patient safety 
and the establishment of patient safety programs (Ilan & Fowler, 2005). Final guidelines 
were released in 2008. Healthcare entities continue to develop strategies for 
implementation (Groszek).   
Hospital Administration   
Rivard et al. (2008) found statistically significant associations on the negative 
impact of poor patient safety on outcomes in the VA on mortality, length of stay, and 
cost. The effects of patient safety improvement are clearly evident. There is a recognized 
need for executive leadership to support patient safety (McFadden, Stock, & Gowen, 
2006). Challenges with the cultural aspect of patient safety remain as the health care 
industry struggles to embrace a "no-blame" culture and a system failure perspective 
(Groszek, 2010). It is recognized that full disclosure of adverse events and medical errors 
is required in an open patient safety culture and for systems improvement (Rivard et al.). 
Despite promising efforts, challenges in regards to patient safety still remain 
(Groszek, 2010). Perceptions of safety climate differ by workgroup and management 
level (Singer et al., 2009). Clear direction is necessary to communicate organizational 
commitment. To achieve a successful patient safety culture, leadership should foster an 
environment where: 
• Perceptions and attitudes regarding safety are constant 
• Organizational procedures, policies, and resources are in place to support safety 
culture 
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• Adequate education and training are available for personnel 
• Auditing and evaluation of processes and standards occur regularly 
(Hartmann et al., 2008) 
Economic Implications  
One of the main barriers to improving overall care and quality is the lack of 
financial motivation for doing so within the VA system. The VA is a self-funded federal 
system covering all patient costs including those due to error or neglect; reimbursement 
for claims and financial penalties for adverse events are not present within the system. 
Currently there is not a universal standard with demands (fines) and incentives from 
payers, purchasers, and regulatory bodies (Groszek, 2010). Mello, Studdert, Thomas, 
Yoon, and Brennan (2007) reviewed almost 15,000 medical records from over 20 
hospitals where they uncovered 465 adverse events, including 127 negligent injuries. The 
estimated total cost of adverse events was about $439 million. The average cost per 
injury was $58,766 for all adverse events and $113,280 for the negligent injuries (Mello 
et al.). In 2007 hospitals absorbed approximately $238 of injury-related costs for every 
patient treated that year; they externalized (billed) $1,775 in injury-related costs per 
admission. Among the hospitals in the study, malpractice premiums averaged $123 per 
patient (Mello et al.). 
Van et al. (2011) used an analysis of comparative rates to measure the frequency 
and costs of measurable medical errors nationally. This method used mathematical 
models to assess the risk of occurrence and to project costs to the total population. The 
estimated annual cost of measurable medical errors that harm patients was $17.1 billion 
with an additional $37.6 billion for adverse events. Pressure ulcers were the most 
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common measurable medical error, followed by postoperative infections (Van et al.). 
More than half of the estimated total medical cost of medical errors comes from the types 
of medical injuries most likely to be caused by error. 
When looking at the financial impact of patient safety, one can compare 
hospitalization cost with the cost of hospitalization that has been accompanied by 
complications and adverse events. West et al. (2008) reported that the instances of 
decubitus ulcer, postoperative DVT and accidental puncture or laceration were increasing 
significantly within the VA (decubitus ulcer, p< .001; postoperative DVT, p< .001; and 
accidental puncture or laceration, p<.0001). Rivard et al. (2008) applied cost estimates 
and increases in length of stay for common adverse events in the VA, with assistance 
from the Health Economics Research Center. Calculations combined pseudo-bill methods 
and cost regression to allocate actual VA expenditures, including providers but excluding 
malpractice insurance (Rivard et al.). Length of stay was increased along with costs 
ranging from 1.34 days and $8,271 for accidental puncture or laceration to 10.89 days 
and $57,727 for postoperative sepsis. The outcomes yielded significantly higher costs (p 
< .0001) for hospitalizations with the adverse events (Rivard et al.). 
Legal system 
The United States medical liability system is currently entangled in a malpractice 
crisis. Plaintiff lawyers and some advocates for patient safety believe malpractice 
lawsuits will make physicians take responsibility for their actions. Hence a reduction in 
malpractice litigation will occur when physicians focus on patient safety and make fewer 
errors (Dalton, Samaropoulos, & Dalton, 2008). This has caused patient safety and 
healthcare quality to become mainstream health care policy issues. 
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Traditionally, healthcare organizations are comprised of steep authority 
hierarchies that are reluctant to admit mistakes. Excessive workloads and inadequate 
teamwork often lead to adverse events. Historically health care organizations were 
tolerant of inconsistency in patient care and focused on punitive actions for errors 
(Groszek, 2010). Errors that occur in health care are multi-facetted, often requiring 
system improvements with organizational change to prevent adverse events. However, 
improvements in patient safety can reduce preventable medical errors and bring relief 
from the medical malpractice crisis. The variables involved in adverse events have 
increased debates over tort reform and the current malpractice system creates ongoing 
challenges (Groszek). 
Only 2.5 percent of the 27 percent of patients injured by negligence filed a 
malpractice claim (Mello et al., 2007). After reviewing almost 15,000 medical records 
from over 20 hospitals, Mello and colleagues estimated the cost of malpractice insurance 
premiums averaged $238 per admission. Injured patients, their families, and their health 
insurers shoulder approximately 78 percent of costs associated with injuries, and 70 
percent of the negligent injuries (Mello et al.). 
Adverse events could potentially be alleviated through safety system 
improvements. This will necessitate a cultural shift toward patient safety with 
organizational commitment (Lynch, 2010). Adoption and change of our existing health 
care system is needed to remain viable. Including a culture oriented toward patient safety 
will be crucial to this.  Health care organizations need to adopt new ways of viewing 
safety, advancing the industry, and preventing errors. 
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Organizational Culture and Patient Safety 
Changing organizational culture presents its own challenges (Colla, et al., 2005). 
Despite significant investment and efforts to attract attention to patient safety, the 
dissemination and implementation of evidence-based safety practices has been meager at 
best (Landrigan et al., 2010). Evidence lies in current practice; nationally only 1.5 percent 
of hospitals have implemented electronic medical records, 9.1 percent have basic 
electronic record keeping, and only 17 percent have computerized provider order entry. 
Routinely residents and nurses work more hours than recommended for safe patient care. 
Even simple interventions, such as hand washing, have poor compliance in health care 
organizations (Landrigan et al.).  
Quality of care has become a focal point, as health care organizations have 
become tolerant of inconsistencies in patient care (Woodard, 2005). Patient safety 
indicators provide a method of measuring quality improvement. Measurements of quality 
improvement are critical to be able to demonstrate effective change. Administration must 
provide ongoing support to direct corrective actions and improve inconsistencies (Teruya, 
2004). 
Interactions of organizational structures and control systems produce shared 
beliefs, values and behavioral norms, all of which are necessary to support a patient-
centric safety culture (Hellings, Schrooten, Klazinga, & Vleugels, 2007). Transforming 
organizational culture is a vital element in quality improvement (Mohr, 2005). 
Developing a patient safety culture affects multiply aspects of health care.  
Since 2002, the Joint Commission’s performance improvement standards have 
encouraged hospitals to formally assess staff perceptions of safety risks and improvement 
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opportunities and to compare these data with those of similar external sources (Singer et 
al., 2009). Benchmarking patient safety culture survey results by participation in 
collaboratives is an effective way for hospitals to target quality improvement efforts. The 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality established the Hospital Survey on Patient 
Safety Culture Comparative Database for this purpose in 2006 (Singer et al.).  
Conclusion 
Opportunities for error exist, adverse events occur, and challenges exist. 
However, patients will continue to experience preventable adverse events unless steps are 
taken (Rivard at el., 2008). Development of an organizational safety culture improves 
patient outcomes by opening communication, enhancing teamwork and providing a more 
supportive environment (McFadden et al., 2006). Health care organizations, 
administration, and health care providers must work toward the ultimate goal of creating 
a culture of patient safety and better health care outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical foundation of Deming’s quality approach stresses the constancy of 
a purpose, goal setting, employee empowerment, continuous quality improvement and 
teamwork. This framework is currently used by both Station 593 as their quality 
improvement theory and AHRQ in their Comparative Database Report (Sorra & Dyer, 
2012). The theory of Total Quality Management (TQM), based on systems theory, is used 
to explain and reduce the risk of errors. W. Edwards Deming first developed and 
introduced TQM to Japanese industry (W. Edwards Deming Institute, n.d.). The 
framework is based on a systems approach with the intent of decreasing deficiencies in an 
organization. TQM focused on eliminating or minimizing underlying errors in an 
organization. Historically this approach has been adopted by high-risk industries such as 
aviation, before it was acknowledged as a method to improve health care processes 
(Deming, 1986).  
The use of Deming’s framework supports TQM in health care by constructing a 
management system built on sustaining process improvements in a way to provide 
measureable, obtainable change. Deming’s contributions within health care have 
provided theoretical support for numerous projects at Station 593 and are part of the 
organization’s current process improvement system. The integration of Deming’s 
framework for this project supports use of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 
(HSOPS) to identify deficiencies, enhance communication, and set goals for process and 
quality improvement in a language that is familiar to both administration and staff.  
Enhancing awareness and supporting a culture of patient safety requires looking 
at the problem from numerous viewpoints at Station 593. The HSOPS assisted in identify 
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deficiencies and included staff from various units and occupations. This approach allows 
employees equal participation in the improvement process. The HSOPS results allow for 
benchmarking continuous performance and quality improvement processes. The four key 
points of Deming’s framework used in this project are: 
• Adoption of new philosophy/viewpoint 
• Involve everyone in the transformation  
• Break down barriers between departments 
• Improve all systems continually 
(Deming, 1986) 
The core of the Deming framework is the creation of an organizational system of 
continuous quality improvement. The principles of safety culture align with the concepts 
and dimensions described by Deming. Taking action requires the provision of necessary 
resources and support. Deficiencies must be clearly identified and measurable goals 
established for monitoring progress (Deming, 1986). Sorra and Dyer (2012) concluded 
tracking measures of progress is critical to realizing patient safety culture improvement. 
Spigener and Angelo (2001) refer to the emergence of a new paradigm for quality 
improvement that is behavior based. Deming’s framework supports holistic thinking. 
Creating a holistic organization is important in developing an organizational culture that 
emphasizes employee involvement. Deming (1986) addressed behavior based quality 
management for managers that focus on: data based fact-finding versus faultfinding; 
promotion of pride in work; and systems improvement (Spigener & Angelo, 2001). 
Designing a health care system to increase a patient safety culture requires an 
organization to implement a behavioral and cultural change (Scott et al., 2003). 
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The dimensions of the Deming framework foster communication, which is a key 
component of patient safety culture, and understanding of quality practices that leads to 
TQM. Deming’s framework supports the role leadership plays as critical in establishing a 
pathway to the success of quality improvement (Anderson, Rungtusanatham, & 
Schroeder, 1994). This is then reflected in the perceptions of patient safety culture.  
Implementing action plans is one of the hardest challenges an organization can 
face (Sorra & Dyer, 2012). Deming’s framework provides an organizational perspective 
based on quality improvement. The essence of Deming’s management philosophy is to 
improve quality by reducing deficiencies and eliminating preventable errors (Miyagawa 
& Yoshida, 2005). This framework supports using a nonpunitive approach, focused on 
understanding the built-in weakness within the systems that lead to errors (Deming, 
1986). A nonpunitive approach is a key component in facilitating a patient safety culture 
(Sorra & Dyer). In order for interventions to decrease errors, errors must be analyzed and 
system problems must be identified (Deming).  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this project was to assess staff perceptions on Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) core dimensions of patient safety culture at 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Southern Nevada inpatient facility – Mike 
O’Callaghan Federal Medical Center (MOFMC).  
Ethical Concerns 
The research involved minimal risk to the participants. The probability and 
magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research was not greater than that 
encountered in their normal work assignment. An informed consent form was used to 
explain the purpose of the study, the risks, and benefits to the participants. Contact 
information for the primary investigator and the site-specific co-investigator was 
included. Each participant was provided the time necessary to read the informed consent 
form and was provided a contact telephone number to call to ask questions regarding the 
study and their participation.  
IRB Approval and Informed Consent. 
Approval of the project proposal was obtained from the University Graduate 
Committee. Additionally, a request for institutional review board (IRB) approval was 
obtained from the VA Southern Nevada, as well as to the University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas (UNLV) IRB. To protect identities of study participants, completing the survey 
indicated consent. Request for waiver of signature for Informed Consent was obtained.   
Informed consent to participate was obtained from each participant per the VA 
policy. Informed consent included necessary information as required by the United States 
Government for VA facility research including:  
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• Participation is voluntary, and refusal to participate or withdrawal from the study 
will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which the employee is otherwise 
entitled 
• The purpose of the research, including the duration and procedures to be followed 
• Descriptions of any prospective research benefits to the participants or others  
• Statement of minimal risk rating and factors that may influence willingness to 
participate 
• Limits of confidentiality, including identifying how the data will be shared and 
maintained  
• Contact information to answer pertinent questions about the research 
• Research participants’ rights  
Sample 
The sample consisted of consenting patient care staff that are employed by the 
VA in the inpatient setting at MOFMC. The total number of VA staff in the facility that 
met this qualification was approximately 150. The goal for participation was a minimum 
of 50% of the 150 possible staff. Targeted participants directly or indirectly contact or 
interact with patients. This includes administration and staff such as physicians, nurses, 
pharmacists, and unit clerks whose work directly affects patient care.  
Inclusion Criteria 
• Currently employed by the VA  
• Assigned to the MOFMC 
• Hold a position that impacts patient care 
• Must be 21 or older   
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• Willing to complete survey 
Marketing Plan 
Prior to data collection an email announcement regarding the survey was sent to 
all inpatient staff involved in patient care, endorsed by leadership and the local Research 
Compliance Officer. Staff was informed of the upcoming survey and Leadership’s 
support of the survey effort. Thereafter blanket reminder emails were sent to all potential 
participants. 
Links to the survey were sent via the email system for staff to complete online, 
via the Internet using survey monkey. Approximately two weeks after sending the 
original survey, a blanket reminder email was sent thanking those who had responded and 
asking the remainder to please complete the survey. Then approximately two weeks after 
sending the reminder email, a final request for participation email was sent.  
Procedure for Recruitment and Data Collection 
Participants were recruited through emails, presentations at staff meetings, at 
daily report, team meetings, and by an advertisement/flyer posted in staff break areas. 
Staff participation was voluntary. All data were self-reported and collected online 
through survey monkey. Surveys could be completed within 10 – 15 minutes and were 
completed anonymously at the participants’ convenience.  
Financial Plan 
The proposed budget for the HSOPC project was minimal. There was no 
anticipated cost for items such as printer supplies and general office supplies as they were 
covered within the normal operating budget of the VA.  
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Scope and Settings 
  The research setting was the VA of Southern Nevada inpatient facility, Mike 
O’Callaghan Federal Medical Center (MOFMC). The medical center is located on Nellis 
Air Force Base, in southern Nevada, and is staffed by active duty Air Force personnel 
and VA employees. The Joint VA portion of the facility includes a 14-bed critical care 
unit and 14-bed emergency room. The VA specific areas include a 34-bed 
medical/surgical unit and a 12-bed inpatient mental health unit. Joint leadership, clinical, 
and ancillary staff, support this facility.  
Project Objectives 
This project assessed the staffs’ perceptions based on responses to the HSOPS of 
patient safety culture within MOFMC. The survey gathered information on general 
demographics, outcome measures and safety culture dimensions that are unit specific and 
hospital-wide. Table 2 outlines the specific dimensions on the HSOPS by category and 
the number of questions that measure that dimension.  
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Table 2 
Survey Items Categorized Across HSOPS Dimensions. 
Dimensions Items/ Number of 
Questions 
Management/supervision 
Management and institutional commitment to safety  
Institutional responses 
Non-punitive response to error  
 
7 
1 
3 
Safety System 
Handoffs and transitions and coordination of care  
Adequacy of staffing  
Adequacy of equipment, information, and processes  
Reporting infrastructure  
 
6 
2 
1 
1 
Work pressure  3 
Procedures/rules  
What should be reported and to whom  
 
3 
Teamwork  6 
Communication openness  3 
Organizational learning  3 
Feedback and communication  2 
Overall perception of safety  3 
Note. (Adapted from Singla et al., 2006) 
 
Reliability and Validity of the Assessment Tool 
The AHRQ Hospital Survey on Patient Safety consists of 42 questions measuring 
14 dimensions using 5-point Likert scales (Appendix A). The survey measures 
respondents’ attitudes on various dimensions of patient safety:  
• Supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting patient safety  
• Organizational learning and continuous improvement  
• Teamwork within units  
• Open communication 
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• Feedback and communication about errors 
• Non-punitive response to error  
• Staffing  
• Hospital management support for patient safety  
• Teamwork across hospital units  
• Hospital handoffs and transitions  
(AHRQ, 2011) 
The HSOPS instrument was piloted in 20 hospitals, and the results were used to 
generate a list of 14 factors, all of which have displayed high internal consistency with a 
Chronbach’s alpha-α of 0.63 to 0.84 (Appendix B) (AHRQ; Singla et al., 2006). 
Secondary analysis by Colla et al. (2005) concluded the quantity and quality of 
psychometric testing were comprehensive and sound. Currently the HSOPS is used 
nationally in over 1,128 hospitals with comparative database supported by AHRQ. The 
database serves as a resource for benchmarking in support of patient safety culture 
improvement. 
Evaluation Plan 
 Responses were analyzed utilizing specific AHRQ created software, Hospital 
Survey on Patient Safety Culture Data Entry and Analysis Tool (HSPSC-DEAT). 
Demographic data were summarized to provide a description of the participants. The data 
collected were both nominal and ordinal level data requiring non-parametric statistics. 
The following statistical analysis techniques were used in this study.  
1. Descriptive statistics were used to address frequencies and means.  
2. Chi-square was used to compare the frequencies, and the distribution of differences 
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among work areas (units) and employee’s profession (nurse, physician) was 
analyzed using HSPSC-DEAT.  
3. Data that were evaluated with HSPSC-DEAT one-way analysis of variance were 
coded to assist with the statistical analysis. For example, measurement variables 
were assigned a numerical value with 5=Always/Strongly agree, 4= Often/Agree, 
3= Sometimes/Neither agree nor disagree, 2= Seldom/Disagree, and 1= 
Never/Strongly disagree.  
Treatment of Data 
 All raw data were secured under lock and key at the study site until data collection was 
completed, whereafter aggregated data were transferred to the office of the Principal 
Investigator, Dr. Carolyn Yucha, in compliance with UNLV IRB policies. Any 
information stored on computer was behind a locked door and password protected. Data 
that were stored on computer systems is stored indefinitely per VA policy at the 
conclusion of the study. As per policy, information was shared thorough secured channels 
with IRB approved sources. 
Table 3 
Project Timeline.  
May to July 
2012 
August/ 
September 
September / 
October 
October - 
November 
December  
to January  
2013 
February  
2013 
VA IRB 
submission 
Market study 
for 
participation 
Coordinator 
survey start 
date 
Compile 
Data 
 
Complete 
draft of 
project  
Complete 
final written 
report 
Submission to 
UNLV IRB 
Confirm start 
dates based on 
IRB approval 
Completion 
of survey 
 
Complete 
statistical 
analysis 
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
Sample Description 
The sample consisted of 78 inpatient care staff, of the 150 personnel invited to 
participate, with a response rate of 52%. The Department of Department of Veterans 
Affairs (VA) employed the study participants at the Mike O’Callaghan Federal Medical 
Center (MOFMC). The first email soliciting interested participants was sent December 4, 
2012; the final study survey was completed on January 14, 2013.  
Sample respondents represented a variety of clinical areas as shown in Table 4. 
The majority of the sample, 87%, responded they typically have direct contact with 
patients, versus 13% who have no patient contact. Registered Nurses represented the 
most common respondent staff position as noted in Table 5. Time worked in current 
specialty or profession ranged from; less than one year (9%), one to five years (31%), six 
to ten years (24%), 11 to 15 years (17%), 16 to 20 years (4%), and those with over 21 
years of experience (15%).  
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Table 4 
Respondent Demographics – Work Area/Unit 
 
Note. ‘Many different units’ includes positions such as coordinators, respiratory therapy, and case 
managers whom are assigned to multiple units; ‘other’ includes biomedical, quality management, nursing 
education, and patient safety personnel. 
 
 
Table 5 
Respondent Demographics - Staff Position 
Staff Position n Percent of total 
Registered nurse 63 81% 
LVN / LPN 1 1% 
Patient care aide / care partner 2 3% 
Respiratory therapist  1 1% 
Administration / management  5 6% 
Other  6 8% 
Total 78 100% 
 	  
Work Area/Unit n Percent of total 
Many different units 9 12% 
Medicine/surgical 32 41% 
Intensive care unit  18 23% 
Mental health  8 10% 
Emergency department 6 8% 
Other  5 6% 
Total 78 100% 
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Primary Findings 
Data were analyzed with tool specific software created by AHRQ. The Hospital 
Survey on Patient Safety Culture Data Entry and Analysis Tool (HSPSC-DEAT) 
calculated the hospital's percent of positive responses. This included two non-composite 
questions on patient safety grade and number of events reported. Results were compared 
to the AHRQ database averages, allowing percentile scores comparison and placement of 
the MOFMC’s results relative to the distribution of database hospitals. 
Non-Composite Scores – Comparative Results. 
Two questions are not combined in the HSOPS. The first question is on staff’s 
perception regarding patient safety; the second asks staff members how many incident 
reports they have completed in the last 12 months (Figure 1, Figure 2). Results were 
compared to the AHRQ database average, allowing percentile score comparison of 
survey results in relation to the AHRQ hospital database. Key items in this section are the 
variation in the overall score Grade A and B. The database average for A was 30% versus 
5% MOFMC; for B it was 45% versus 26% for the MOFMC.  
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Figure 1. Overall Patient Safety Grade. 
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Figure 2. Number of Events Reported. 
 
Composite Scores. 
Areas of strength are identified as those in which 75% of the respondents 
answered as strongly agree/agree, or always/most of the time, if asked in a positive 
manner. Items that scored 50% or less positive responses are areas for improvement. This 
represents questions answered positively strongly agree/agree and disagree/strongly 
disagree on reverse/negatively worded questions. These responses are identified as 
requiring process improvement, suggesting that greater than half of those responding are 
expressing a concern for patient safety. 
Scores on the HOPSH survey are calculated for each hospital by averaging the 
percent positive response on the items within the composite, regardless if they are 
positively or negatively worded. For example, for a four-item composite, if the item-level 
percent positive responses were 50 percent, 45 percent, 50 percent, and 55 percent, the 
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percentages, or 50 percent positive. Following data entry into HSPSC-DEAT, a 
calculated percent positive response for each safety culture composites was returned. This 
allowed for a comparison with pooled data from the 1,128 database hospitals. 
In Figure 3 the composite for handoffs and transitions is identified as the area 
needing the most improvement, with a positive response rate of only 13%, suggesting 
that 87% of the respondents felt this area was problematic. Teamwork across units, and 
feedback and communication regarding errors, were the next lowest scoring segments, at 
15% and 18%, respectively. The strongest composite section was staffing, with a 54% 
positive reply, suggesting this to be an area of strength for the hospital.  
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Figure 3. Composite-Level Results for MOFMC. 
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 This area was identified as most in need of improvement, with a positive response 
rate of only 13%. This composite score consists of four negatively worded questions. In 
Table 6 the results from the MOFMC are compared to AHRQ database. The score range 
of maximum and minimum scores is provided for reference.  
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four main units responding to the survey. These results show the Medical/Surgical Unit 
with the largest difference between the database scores, at 46%, and their unit scores at 
7%. The Emergency Department had the highest positive response rate within the 
hospital at 25% compared to AHRQ database at 48%. However, that suggests that 75% of 
the respondents from the Emergency Department still felt that handoff and transitions are 
a concern for patient safety. 
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Table 6 
Handoffs and Transitions: Item-Level Comparative Results. 
Questions 
Survey Item % Positive 
Response 
Database Hospitals Range 
of % Positive 
 MOFMC 
Database 
Average Minimum Maximum 
Things “fall between the 
cracks” when transferring 
patients from one unit to 
another 
8% 41% 8% 89% 
Important patient care 
information is often lost 
during shift changes 
20% 51% 16% 89% 
Problems often occur in the 
exchange of information 
across hospital units 
8% 44% 6% 88% 
Shift changes are 
problematic for patients in 
this hospital 
15% 45% 15% 92% 
Note. Questions in this composite are reverse worded: positive responses are noted as strongly 
disagree/disagree or never/rarely. 
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Figure 4. Handoff and Transition Composite Level Results by Unit. 	  
 
For the question: Things “fall between the cracks” when transferring patients 
from one unit to another (Figure 5). The Medical/Surgical Unit demonstrated the largest 
difference between the database score of 41% and their unit score of 3%. Mental Health 
had the highest positive response rate within the hospital at 13% compared to AHRQ 
database at 35%.  
For the question: Important patient care information is often lost during shift 
changes (Figure 6). The Medical/Surgical Unit presented the largest difference between 
the database score of 51% and their unit score of 9%. Mental Health and the Emergency 
Department had positive response rates within a 25% range of the AHRQ comparative 
database. Mental Health was at 25% compared to AHRQ database at 50%, while the 
Emergency Department was at 33% compared to AHRQ database at 58%.  
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Figure 5. Handoff and Transition Question 1 Composite Level Results by Unit. 
 
 
  
Figure 6. Handoff and Transition Question 2 Composite Level Results by Unit. 
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For the question: Problems often occur in the exchange of information across 
hospital units (Figure 7). Mental Health had the largest difference between the database 
score of 39% and their unit score of 0% (there were no positive responses). The 
Emergency Department had the highest positive response rate within the hospital at 33% 
compared to the AHRQ database at 45%. 
For the question: Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital 
(Figure 8). The intensive care unit presented the largest difference between the database 
score of 58% and their unit score of 18%. Mental Health had the highest positive 
response rate within the hospital, at 25%, compared to AHRQ database at 43%. 
 
 
 Figure 7. Handoff and Transition Question 3 Composite Level Results by Unit. 
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 Figure 8. Handoff and Transition Question 4 Composite Level Results by Unit. 
 
Teamwork Across Units – Composite Level Comparative Results.  
 Composite data on teamwork across units suggested this area as second most in 
need of improvement. This composite score consists of two negatively worded questions 
and two positively worded questions. In Table 7 the results from the MOFMC are 
compared to AHRQ database. The score range of maximum and minimum scores is 
provided for reference.  
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Table 7 
Teamwork Across Units: Item-Level Comparative Results.  
Questions 
Survey Item % Positive 
Response 
Database Hospitals 
Range of % Positive 
 MOFMC 
Database 
Average Minimum Maximum 
Hospital units do not 
coordinate well with each other 12% 46% 12% 93% 
There is good cooperation 
among hospital units that need 
to work together 
13% 60% 21% 95% 
It is often unpleasant to work 
with staff from other hospital 
units 
17% 59% 29% 93% 
Hospital units work well 
together to provide the best 
care for patients 
19% 68% 19% 100% 
Note. Two questions in this composite are reverse worded: positive responses are noted as strongly 
disagree/disagree or never/rarely. 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the percent positive response on the four main units responding to 
the survey. These results show the Medical/Surgical Unit with the largest difference 
between the database scores, at 57%, and their unit scores at 8%. The Emergency 
Department had the highest positive response rate within the hospital at 25% compared to 
AHRQ database at 48%.  
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Figure 9. Teamwork Across Units Composite-Level Comparative Average.  	  
 
For the question: Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other (Figure 
10). The Medical/Surgical Unit demonstrated the largest difference between the database 
score of 44% and their unit score of 3%. Emergency Department had the highest positive 
response rate within the hospital at 17% compared to AHRQ database at 36%. 
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Figure 10. Teamwork Across Units Question 1 Composite Level Results by Unit. 	  
 
 
Figure 11. Teamwork Across Units Question 2 Composite Level Results by Unit. 
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of 61% and their unit score of 13%. The Emergency Department had the highest positive 
response rate within the hospital at 33% compared to the AHRQ database at 50%. 
For the question: Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for 
patients (Figure 13). The Medical/Surgical Unit presented the largest difference between 
the database score of 66% and their unit score of 6%. Mental Health had the highest 
positive response rate within the hospital, at 38%, compared to AHRQ database at 61%. 
 
 
Figure 12. Teamwork Across Units Question 3 Composite Level Results by Unit. 	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Figure 13. Teamwork Across Units Question 4 Composite Level Results by Unit. 
 
 
Feedback and Communication About Error – Composite Level Comparative 
Results.  
 Composite data on feedback and communication about error is ranked third most 
in need of improvement. This composite score consists of three positively worded 
questions. In Table 8 the results from the MOFMC are compared to AHRQ database. The 
score range of maximum and minimum scores is provided for reference.  
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Table 8 
Feedback and Communication About Error: Item-Level Comparative Results  
Questions 
Survey Item % Positive 
Response 
Database Hospitals 
Range of % Positive 
 MOFMC 
Database 
Average Minimum Maximum 
We are given feedback about 
changes put into place based 
on event reports 
13% 56% 6% 88% 
We are informed about errors 
that happen in this unit  19% 65% 26% 93% 
In this unit, we discuss ways 
to prevent errors from 
happening again 
22% 72% 43% 93% 
 
 
 
The hospital level composite data for feedback and communication about error 
can be further broken down into unit level data. Figure 14 shows the percent positive 
response on the four main units responding to the survey. These results show the 
Medical/Surgical Unit with the largest difference between the database scores, at 60%, 
and their unit scores at 13%. The Mental Health had the highest positive response rate 
within the hospital at 29% compared to AHRQ database at 65%. 
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Figure 14. Feedback and Communication About Error Composite Level Comparative 
Average. 
 	  
For the question: We are given feedback about changes put into place based on 
event reports (Figure 15). The Medical/Surgical Unit demonstrated the largest difference 
between the database score of 54% and their unit score of 9%. The Emergency 
Department had the highest positive response rate within the hospital at 17% compared to 
AHRQ database at 51%.  
For the question: We are informed about errors that happen in this unit (Figure 
16). The Intensive Care Unit presented the largest difference between the database score 
of 58% and their unit score of 11%. Mental Health had the highest positive response rate 
at 25% compared to AHRQ database at 65%. 
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Figure 15. Feedback and Communication About Error Question 1 Composite Level 
Results by Unit. 
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Figure 16. Feedback and Communication About Error Question 2 Composite Level 
Results by Unit. 
 
 
For the question: In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening 
again (Figure 17). Medical/Surgical Unit had the largest difference between the database 
score of 67% and their unit score of 13%. Mental Health had the highest positive 
response rate within the hospital at 50% compared to the AHRQ database at 71%.  
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Figure 17. Feedback and Communication About Error Question 3 Composite Level 
Results by Unit. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION, INTERPRETATION, AND PLAN 
This chapter includes a discussion of the study findings and reviews the 
limitations of this project. The purpose of this project was to gain a better understanding 
on patient safety culture among hospital-based staff. Study design involved collecting 
responses to a descriptive survey on the perceptions of patient safety culture within the 
targeted organization. Use of a descriptive survey allowed quantification of the hospital 
staffs’ perceptions of and towards their current patient safety culture.  
These collected surveys provided suggestions for continuous quality improvement 
(CQI) initiatives, which include areas for improvement as identified in the previous 
chapter. Additionally, potential future areas for process improvements and impact from 
this project will be discussed.  
Discussion on Analysis  
The main goal of this study was to assess the staff’s perception of patient safety 
culture. This perception was based on the scores determined by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 
(HSOPS). Among the key purposes of the AHRQ survey are the development and 
support tools to assess patient safety culture (AHRQ, 2004). Study project results are 
based on the following categories: 
• Comparison – allows a comparison of results with other hospitals or across units 
• Assessment and Learning – provides initial and comparison data, facilitates staff 
exposure in the patient safety improvement process 
• Information – data identifies strengths and areas with potential for improvement 
in patient safety culture 
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• Trending – depicts changes in patient safety culture over time 
 
The 2012 AHRQ Hospital Database consists of an aggregated data set from 1,128 
hospitals. Hospitals that submitted information to the database were not a statistically 
selected sample of all U.S. hospitals, rather they represented hospitals that administered 
the survey and were willing to submit their data for inclusion. However, Sorra and Dyer 
(2012) state the characteristics of the database hospitals are consistent with the American 
Hospital Associations distribution of hospitals. The average hospital response rate for the 
database was 53 percent; with Medical/Surgical units were the largest respondents. The 
majority of respondents in the database had direct interaction with patients. All consistent 
with the MOFMC results.  
Hospitals that administered the survey are not required to undergo any training. 
The survey has been administered in a variety of different ways; paper-only survey, web-
only surveys, and combinations of these two methods. It is possible different modes 
could lead to differences in survey responses. In addition, some hospitals survey all 
hospital staff, while others administer the survey to a representative sample of staff.  
The Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Data Entry and Analysis Tool 
(HSPSC-DEAT) was created to provide comparisons between the study population and 
the database. The database shows the average percentage of positive responses across 
participating hospitals on each of the survey's items and composites. Comparisons can be 
completed at the hospitals or unit level. This is accomplished by reporting the average 
across hospitals in an effort to ensure that each hospital receives an equal contribution to 
the overall average.  
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AHRQ (2004) supports the reporting of data at the hospital level in this way as 
organizational culture is considered to be a group characteristic, not an individual 
characteristic. When comparing results with the database, it is important to keep in mind 
that the database provides relative comparisons (Sorra & Dyer, 2012). The comparative 
data provided in this report should be used to supplement the MOFMC’s internal efforts 
toward identifying areas of strength as well as those needing patient safety culture 
improvements. 
Due to the nature of pooled scoring the AHRQ (2004) recommends using a 
minimum 5-percentage point difference when comparing results with database averages. 
For example, if the MOFMC’s percent positive score is greater than 5 percentage points 
higher then the database average it can be considered above average. Conversely, if the 
score is below 5 percentage points or more then it may be considered below average. This 
information can then be used to identify of areas of strength as well as those requiring 
improvement processes. 
Outcomes Discussion  
 The research question asked for this project was: What is the staff’s perception of 
patient safety culture, based on scores using the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety 
Culture, in Mike O’Callaghan Federal Medical Center?  
Examination of the composite level data (Figure 3) is an appropriate beginning to 
this discussion. Table 7 shows the reorganized composite level data prioritized by 
positive response rates to identify the categories in need for patient safety improvement 
processes. By identifying the lowest scoring areas we allow for communication, planning 
and focused interventions to address the needs in an organized manner. A common theme 
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elicited in the three lowest scoring composites is problems related to communication. 
Continuous quality improvement is dependent upon communication activities that 
support and create a work environment conducive to this.  
Table 9 
Composite-Level Results for the MOFMC. 
Patient Safety Culture Composites Average Percent 
Positive Response 
Handoffs and transitions 13% 
Teamwork across units 15% 
Feedback and communication about error 18% 
Management support for patient safety 25% 
Overall perceptions of patient safety 26% 
Communication openness 27% 
Nonpunitive response to error 29% 
Frequency of events reported 30% 
Supervisor/manager promotes patient safety 41% 
Teamwork within units 44% 
Continuous improvement 44% 
Staffing 54% 
Note. The table has been reorganized in ascending order of average percent positive results. 
 
The delivery of care among health-care staff involves continuous bidirectional 
interactions. The relationship between feedback and communications regarding errors is 
strongest with event reporting (El-Jardali, Dimassi, Jamal, Jaafar, & Hemadeh, 2011). 
This highlights the importance of open communication regarding errors and allowing 
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feedback about the effects of implemented changes. This is a crucial part of enhancing 
the culture of patient safety.  
The lack of continuity is an unfortunate reality of hospital care. Nurses and other 
providers cannot be present in the hospital around the clock; hence many different 
providers will inevitably care for patients. Composite measures of handoffs and 
transitions assess the patient care information that is shared across hospital units and 
during shift changes. Hospital realities with nurses shift changes and multiple physicians 
responsible for a patient's care creates numerous opportunities for error. Data from this 
study indicated respondents felt information is not accurately transferred between units or 
care providers; suggesting critical information is lost or not communicated when 
transferring patients across hospital units. 
Providing safe care depends on highly trained individuals with different roles and 
responsibilities acting together in the best interests of the patient. Teamwork represents 
the integration of different units into the organizational structure of the hospital. Hospital 
unit coordination and cooperation with one another is critical to provide the best care for 
patients. Teamwork is a fundamental aspect of CQI and necessary for daily continuous 
improvement activities. A majority of respondents had a negative perception of teamwork 
across hospital units. This suggests a lack of cooperation among hospital units that need 
to work together. Hospital units are not coordinating well with each other and staff find it 
difficult to work with other hospital units.  
Feedback and communication regarding errors that have occurred is identified as 
a problem area.  El-Jardali, Dimassi, Jamal, Jaafar, and Hemadeh (2011) reported the 
number of event reports filed is significantly associated with the composite questions 
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measuring communication openness. Feedback and communication about errors, 
problems associated with hospital handoffs, transitions, and teamwork across hospital 
units all fall into this broad category of measuring communication openness. Only 15% 
of respondents felt adequate feedback and communication regarding errors is given. 
Consequently, 85% of the respondents felt they were not informed about errors that 
happen at the unit level. Additionally, discussions regarding future error prevention were 
not taking place. It was also felt there was a lack of feedback given related to changes put 
into place based on event reports.  
Action Planning for Improvement 
Stock, McFadden, and Gowen (2010) suggest that linking staffs’ perceptions 
toward patient safety culture in the delivery of and improvement in quality of care may 
result in the development of a work environment based continuous quality improvement. 
Designing models of quality improvement through the active participation of employees 
may enhance quality initiatives. This study addressed the notion that key components 
within patient safety culture are the building blocks to quality improvement. Moreover, 
the lack of quality may be the result of the lack of a cultural commitment to safety.  
The nation’s current health-care system lacks the culture needed to ensure that 
services are safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient and equitable (Institute of 
Medicine, 2001). The significance of this study is in the assumption that perceptions of 
patient safety culture among hospital staff can provide additional understanding of 
quality in the delivery of care. Organizational culture can act as a means for improving 
quality within healthcare. However, there is evidence that successful implementation of 
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quality care initiatives requires emphasis on employee empowerment, autonomy, 
professional values, and knowledge management (Rabanni, Jafri Abbas, & Jaham, 2009). 
Health-care organizations are being pressured to improve patient safety (Stock, 
McFadden, & Gowen, 2010). Simply conducting a survey is not the end point of this 
process; rather they are actually just the beginning. Surveys in and of themselves, are not 
a means for creating lasting change; organizational actions, planning and follow-up, are 
necessary for a sustainable change to occur.  
Sorra and Dyer (2012) offer seven step action plan based on survey data. This 
process gives guidance on the process to turn survey results into actual patient safety 
culture improvement: (1) understand your survey results; (2) communicate and discuss 
the survey results; (3) develop focused action plans; (4) communicate action plans and 
deliverables; (5) implement action plans; (6) track progress and evaluate impact; and (7) 
share what works. 
1. Understanding of survey results. It is important to review the survey results and 
interpret them before looking to develop action plans. For the MOFMC we have 
identified the weakest traits and ranked the remaining sections noting potential 
strengths through this survey.  
Based on these results there is substantial room for improvement at MOFMC. 
However, it is important to focus improvements, recognizing that not everything 
can be addressed at once. Utilizing our understanding of key strengths and areas 
for improvement will help develop a sound plan for improvement. Overall, the 
results from the MOFMC fall on the low side when compared to the other 
hospitals within the database. Many of the scores fall close to the minimum listed 
	   	  57 
within the AHRQ database. Following the guidance offered by AHRQ tools in 
targeting problem areas this study identifies the areas with the highest needs for 
intervention.  
2. Another important part of this process is communicating and sharing survey 
results with affected parties. Survey respondents gave low scores on feedback and 
communication about error; sharing this information will assist in building an 
organizational commitment to improve patient safety. Feedback from this study 
will be shared with the Veterans Affairs Research and Development department. 
A formal presentation will be given to the Patient Safety Committee, and the 
American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) Union will be briefed. 
Results will be shared at staff meetings to reach the direct care providers. By 
sharing this information we achieve several goals. These data are offered as direct 
feedback to participants of the survey and we bring attention to patient safety and 
current perceived risks. This can also be used as an opportunity to invite 
participation in follow-up activities, such as focus groups or interviews with staff 
to find out more about particular issues and why they remain problematic while 
soliciting suggestions for improvement. 
3. Develop a formal written action plan. This will help guide progress toward 
change as well as document the steps to be used to achieve that change. Action 
plans can include department, unit based, or hospital wide goals. Crucial to this 
will be fostering an environment where staff are encouraged and empowered to 
develop action plans at the unit level. The AHRQ (2004) and Sorra and Dyer 
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(2012) suggest using the SMART plan when developing goals: Specific, 
Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time bound. 
4. Once an action plan has been developed, the implementation, goals, and expected 
outcomes need to be communicated. Similarly, roles, responsibilities, and 
timeframe for implementation, with those directly involved or affected should be 
specified. Encouraging the development of actions plans and further 
accountability should be used to demonstrate an organizational commitment to the 
survey results. 
5. Implementing an action plan can present a challenging task. Taking action 
requires the necessary resources and organizational support. Deficiencies must be 
clearly identified and measurable goals established for monitoring progress 
(Deming, 1986). There needs to be a consistent understanding of purpose, goal 
setting, employee empowerment, CQI and teamwork. Appropriate measures to 
track changes and monitor program success must be developed and deployed. All 
of these need to be accomplished in such a way that the action plan can evolve 
and adapt to the environment/unit where the change process is taking place.  
6. Track progress and evaluate impact while implementing change. This ensures a 
timely communication of progress toward goals and increases awareness of 
potential problems. It is important that staff we kept aware of potential impacts 
when changes are being implemented. 
Deming’s framework provides an organizational perspective on quality 
improvement. Deming’s management philosophy is to reduce deficiencies and 
eliminate preventable errors during the process to improve outcome quality 
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(Miyagawa & Yoshida, 2005). Integrating Deming’s framework supports the use 
of the HSOPS to identify deficiencies, enhance communication, and set goals for 
process and quality improvement in a language that is familiar to both 
administration and staff. The PDSA (Plan-Do-Study-Act) cycle is the quality 
improvement model approved by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).  
7. Sharing the potential affect of the changes, positive or negative, will assist them 
in future management of change projects and allow them to provide valuable 
feedback to the change process. Collaborating and sharing of successes or 
failures, with regional and national facilities allows for discussion and future 
planning potential impact on continuous quality improvement throughout the 
healthcare system. 
Recommendations for Improvement. 
This section address recommendations for the previously identified three areas for 
process improvement. The processes, tool development, education, and information 
provide practical resources Leadership can use to implement changes to improve patient 
safety culture and patient safety. The recommendations below are not all-inclusive, but 
provide a resource and guidance to Leadership and Patient Safety personnel about patient 
safety initiatives and process implementation.  
 In 2010, AHRQ created a document identifying potential resources for 
organizations that would like to improve processes as identified in the HSOPS survey. 
Resources that could potentially assist the MOFMC are identified by composite area, 
resource or action, and potential process improvement. Table 8 contains suggestions for 
process improvements at MOFMC. 
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Table 10 
Suggestions for Process Improvement at MOFMC - by Composite Area. 
Composite 
Area 
Resource/ 
Action 
 
Process Improvement Plan 
Handoffs and 
transitions 
 
Education, Tool 
Development 
Implement the IDEAL strategy: Identify patient, 
Diagnosis, recent Events, Anticipated changes, 
Leave time for questions 
 
Education, Tool 
Development 
Improve the handoff process by standardizing 
handoffs, mapping the handoff process, and 
implementing six principles of error-free 
handoffs 
 
Checklist 
Development 
A transition of care list that provides a detailed 
description of effective patient transfer between 
practice settings 
Teamwork 
across units 
 
Education 
Outline tactics to improve communication, 
including resource management, chain-of-
command policies, and teamwork training 
 
Teamwork and 
Communication 
Tools 
Develop tools for; multidisciplinary rounding, 
huddles, rapid response and escalation, and 
structured communication 
 
 
Teamwork Training 
Teamwork training based on roles and 
responsibilities of individuals acting together 
in the best interests of the patient 
Feedback and 
communication 
about error 
Conduct Safety 
Briefings 
Regular scheduled safety briefings in patient 
care units to increase safety awareness among 
frontline staff and foster a culture of safety 
 
Provide Feedback 
to Frontline Staff 
Demonstrate leadership commitment to safety, 
ensuring staff members continue to report 
patient safety issues in a nonpunitive 
environment  
Note. These are the authors’ suggestions and have not been discussed or implemented by MOFMC 
Leadership. 
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Limitations. 
This project had a number of limitations. One is that the results cannot be 
generalized; it gives a “snapshot” of the studied facility at one point in time. The sample 
size (N = 78) represented a 52% response rate. Although that response rate is on target 
with the database response rate of 53% it remains a noted limitation. An additional 
limitation was the poor response rate in ancillary areas, by non-nursing personnel. This 
limitation might be related to the fact the facility has limited VA staff outside of nursing.  
Finally, the data are presented as submitted. The database has been cleaned for 
out-of-range values and blank records. No attempts have been made to verify or audit the 
accuracy of the data submitted to the database.  
Conclusion and Future Plans 
The purpose of this project was to gain a better understanding of hospital staffs’ 
perceptions of patient safety culture as a strategy to improve quality within Veterans 
Administration Station 593. While this project provided insight into one hospital, the 
design acquired information regarding hospital staff perceptions related to components of 
patient safety.  
In conclusion, the information gathered from the survey offers a unique 
opportunity to address deficiencies in patient safety culture. Composite level database 
comparisons to the data collected at MOFMC demonstrated a strong need for patient 
safety process improvements. This project has outlined the necessary information and 
process for planning a continuous quality improvement initiative following Deming’s 
PDSA model. 
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The results of the survey will be presented on a report template to Research and 
Development within the VA. Formal presentations will be given to committees; the 
AFGE will be briefed, and an effort will be made to communicate with the direct care 
providers. 
The goal of this project was to determine the staff’s perception of patient safety 
culture based on the HSOPS tool. This survey has assisted in identifying patient safety 
areas in need of improvement. However, the project results are not the end point in this 
process; it has simply laid the foundation for process improvement. The survey itself is 
not the intervention and surveys do not create lasting change. Systematic action on an 
organizational level, including planning and follow-up, is necessary for a sustainable 
change to occur. The completion of this project represents only the beginning of a 
continuous quality improvement cycle, to improve the culture of patient safety. 
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APPENDIX A. HOSPITAL SURVEY ON PATIENT SAFETY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety 
Instructions 
This survey asks for your opinions about patient safety issues, medical error, and event reporting in your 
hospital and will take about 10 to 15 minutes to complete.  
 
If you do not wish to answer a question, or if a question does not apply to you, you may leave your answer blank. 
 
• An “event” is defined as any type of error, mistake, incident, accident, or 
deviation, regardless of whether or not it results in patient harm. 
• “Patient safety” is defined as the avoidance and prevention of patient injuries 
or adverse events resulting from the processes of health care delivery. 
 
 
SECTION A: Your Work Area/Unit 
In this survey, think of your “unit” as the work area, department, or clinical area of the hospital where you spend 
most of your work time or provide most of your clinical services.   
 
What is your primary work area or unit in this hospital? Select ONE answer. 
 a. Many different hospital units/No specific unit 
 b. Medicine (non-surgical)  h. Psychiatry/mental health  n. Other, please specify: 
 c. Surgery   i. Rehabilitation  
 d. Obstetrics  j. Pharmacy   
 e. Pediatrics  k. Laboratory  
 f. Emergency department  l. Radiology   
 g. Intensive care unit (any type)  m. Anesthesiology   
 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your work area/unit.  
Think about your hospital work area/unit! 
Strongly 
Disagree 
! 
Disagree 
! 
Neither 
! 
Agree 
! 
Strongly 
Agree 
! 
  1. People support one another in this unit .....................................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  2. We have enough staff to handle the workload ..........................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  3. When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a 
team to get the work done .........................................................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  4. In this unit, people treat each other with respect .......................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  5. Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care ................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
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2 
SECTION A: Your Work Area/Unit (continued) 
Think about your hospital work area/unit! 
Strongly 
Disagree 
! 
Disagree 
! 
Neither 
! 
Agree 
! 
Strongly 
Agree 
! 
  6. We are actively doing things to improve patient safety .............................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  7. We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care ...........  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  8. Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them ...................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  9. Mistakes have led to positive changes here ................................................ !1 !2 3 !4 5 
10. It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around 
here ............................................................................................................. !1 !2 3 !4 5 
11. When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out ....................... !1 !2 3 !4 5 
12. When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, 
not the problem ............................................................................................ !1 !2 3 !4 5 
13. After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their 
effectiveness ..............................................................................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
14. We work in "crisis mode" trying to do too much, too quickly .....................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
15. Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done ..........................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
16. Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file .........  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
17. We have patient safety problems in this unit .............................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
18. Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from 
happening ..................................................................................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
 
 
 
SECTION B: Your Supervisor/Manager 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your immediate 
supervisor/manager or person to whom you directly report.  
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
! 
Disagree 
! 
Neither 
! 
Agree 
! 
Strongly 
Agree 
! 
  1. My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job 
done according to established patient safety procedures .........................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  2. My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for 
improving patient safety .............................................................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  3. Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to 
work faster, even if it means taking shortcuts ............................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  4. My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen 
over and over .............................................................................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
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3 
SECTION C: Communications 
How often do the following things happen in your work area/unit? 
Think about your hospital work area/unit! 
Never 
! 
Rarely 
! 
Some-
times 
! 
Most of 
the time 
! 
Always 
! 
  1. We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event 
reports .......................................................................................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  2. Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively 
affect patient care ......................................................................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  3. We are informed about errors that happen in this unit ..............................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  4. Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more 
authority .....................................................................................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  5. In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again ........ !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  6. Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right ....  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
 
SECTION D: Frequency of Events Reported 
In your hospital work area/unit, when the following mistakes happen, how often are they reported?  
 
Never 
! 
Rarely 
! 
Some-
times 
! 
Most of 
the time 
! 
Always 
! 
  1. When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting 
the patient, how often is this reported? ......................................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  2. When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how 
often is this reported? .................................................................................. !1 !2 3 !4 5 
 3. When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, 
how often is this reported? .......................................................................... !1 !2 3 !4 5 
 
SECTION E: Patient Safety Grade 
Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an overall grade on patient safety.   
! ! ! ! ! 
A 
Excellent 
B 
Very Good 
C 
Acceptable 
D 
Poor 
E 
Failing 
 
SECTION F: Your Hospital 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your hospital.   
Think about your hospital! 
Strongly 
Disagree 
! 
Disagree 
! 
Neither 
! 
Agree 
! 
Strongly 
Agree 
! 
  1. Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient 
safety .........................................................................................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  2. Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other ................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  3. Things “fall between the cracks” when transferring patients from one 
unit to another .............................................................................................. !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  4. There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work 
together .....................................................................................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
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SECTION F: Your Hospital (continued)      
Think about your hospital! 
Strongly 
Disagree 
! 
Disagree 
! 
Neither 
! 
Agree 
! 
Strongly 
Agree 
! 
  5. Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes ........  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  6. It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units ..............  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  7. Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital 
units ...........................................................................................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  8. The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top 
priority ........................................................................................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
  9. Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an 
adverse event happens .............................................................................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
10. Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients ......  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
11. Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital .........................  !1 !2 3 !4 5 
 
SECTION G: Number of Events Reported 
In the past 12 months, how many event reports have you filled out and submitted?  
! a. No event reports ! d. 6 to 10 event reports 
! b. 1 to 2 event reports ! e. 11 to 20 event reports 
! c. 3 to 5 event reports ! f. 21 event reports or more 
 
SECTION H: Background Information 
This information will help in the analysis of the survey results. 
1. How long have you worked in this hospital? 
! a. Less than 1 year ! d. 11 to 15 years 
! b. 1 to 5 years ! e. 16 to 20 years 
! c. 6 to 10 years ! f. 21 years or more 
2. How long have you worked in your current hospital work area/unit? 
! a. Less than 1 year ! d. 11 to 15 years 
!b. 1 to 5 years ! e. 16 to 20 years 
! c. 6 to 10 years ! f. 21 years or more 
3. Typically, how many hours per week do you work in this hospital? 
!a. Less than 20 hours per week !d. 60 to 79 hours per week 
! b. 20 to 39 hours per week ! e. 80 to 99 hours per week 
!c. 40 to 59 hours per week ! f. 100 hours per week or more  
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SECTION H: Background Information (continued) 
4. What is your staff position in this hospital?  Select ONE answer that best describes your staff position. 
! a. Registered Nurse  ! j. Respiratory Therapist 
! b. Physician Assistant/Nurse Practitioner ! k. Physical, Occupational, or Speech Therapist 
! c. LVN/LPN ! l. Technician (e.g., EKG, Lab, Radiology) 
! d. Patient Care Asst/Hospital Aide/Care Partner ! m. Administration/Management 
! e. Attending/Staff Physician ! n. Other, please specify:     
! f. Resident Physician/Physician in Training  
! g. Pharmacist  
! h. Dietician  
! i. Unit Assistant/Clerk/Secretary  
5. In your staff position, do you typically have direct interaction or contact with patients?  
! a. YES, I typically have direct interaction or contact with patients. 
! b. NO, I typically do NOT have direct interaction or contact with patients. 
6. How long have you worked in your current specialty or profession? 
!a. Less than 1 year ! d. 11 to 15 years 
! b. 1 to 5 years ! e. 16 to 20 years 
! c. 6 to 10 years ! f. 21 years or more 
 
 
SECTION I: Your Comments 
Please feel free to write any comments about patient safety, error, or event reporting in your hospital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS SURVEY. 
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Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture: Items and Dimensions  
 
In this document, the items in the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture are grouped according to the 
VDIHW\FXOWXUHGLPHQVLRQVWKH\DUHLQWHQGHGWRPHDVXUH7KHLWHP¶VVXUYH\ORFDWLRQLs shown to the left of 
each item. Negatively worded items are indicated. Reliability statistics based on the pilot test data from 21 
hospitals and more than 1,400 staff are provided for the dimensions. 
 
1.  Teamwork Within Units 
(Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree) 
 
A1. People support one another in this unit. 
A3. When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get the work done. 
A4. In this unit, people treat each other with respect. 
A11. When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out. 
  
Reliability of this dimension--&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDLWHPV  
 
2.  Supervisor/Manager Expectations & Actions Promoting Patient Safety1 
 
(Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree) 
 
B1. My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to established patient 
safety procedures. 
B2. My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient safety. 
B3.    Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if it means taking 
shortcuts. (negatively worded) 
B4. My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen over and over. (negatively worded) 
  
Reliability of this dimension--&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDLWHPV  
 
3.  Organizational Learning²Continuous Improvement 
 
(Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree) 
 
A6. We are actively doing things to improve patient safety. 
A9. Mistakes have led to positive changes here. 
A13. After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness. 
  
Reliability of this dimension--&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDLWHPV   
 
4.  Management Support for Patient Safety 
 
(Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree) 
 
F1. Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety. 
F8. The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority. 
F9. Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse event happens. (negatively 
worded) 
  
Reliability of this dimension--&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDLWHPV   
 
                                                 
1 Adapted from Zohar (2000).  A group-level model of safety climate: Testing the effect of group climate on microaccidents in 
manufacturing jobs.  Journal of Applied Psychology, (85) 4, 587-596. 
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5.  Overall Perceptions of Patient Safety 
 
(Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree) 
 
A15. Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done. 
A18. Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening. 
A10. It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don't happen around here. (negatively worded) 
A17. We have patient safety problems in this unit. (negatively worded) 
 
Reliability of this dimension--&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDLWHPV   
 
6.  Feedback & Communication About Error 
 
(Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Most of the time, Always)  
 
C1. We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports. 
C3. We are informed about errors that happen in this unit. 
C5. In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again. 
 
Reliability of this dimension--&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDLWHPV   
 
7.  Communication Openness 
 
(Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Most of the time, Always)  
 
C2. Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care. 
C4. Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority. 
C6. Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right. (negatively worded) 
 
Reliability of this dimension--&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDLWHPV   
 
8.  Frequency of Events Reported 
 
(Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Most of the time, Always)  
 
D1. When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is this reported? 
D2. When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is this reported? 
D3. When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is this reported? 
 
Reliability of this dimension--&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDLWHPV   
 
9.  Teamwork Across Units 
 
(Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree) 
 
F4. There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together. 
F10. Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients. 
F2. Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other. (negatively worded) 
F6. It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units. (negatively worded) 
  
Reliability of this dimension--&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDLWHPV   
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10.  Staffing  
 
(Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree) 
 
A2. We have enough staff to handle the workload. 
A5. Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care. (negatively worded) 
A7. We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care. (negatively worded) 
A14. We work in "crisis mode" trying to do too much, too quickly. (negatively worded) 
  
Reliability of this dimension--&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDLWHPV   
 
11.  Handoffs & Transitions 
 
(Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree) 
 
F3. Things "fall between the cracks" when transferring patients from one unit to another.  
  (negatively worded) 
F5. Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes. (negatively worded) 
F7. Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units. (negatively worded) 
F11. Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital. (negatively worded) 
  
Reliability of this dimension--&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDLWHPV  
 
12.  Nonpunitive Response to Errors 
 
(Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree) 
 
A8. Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them. (negatively worded) 
A12. When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem.  
  (negatively worded) 
A16. Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file. (negatively worded) 
 
Reliability of this dimension--&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDLWHPV   
 
Patient Safety Grade 
 
(Excellent, Very Good, Acceptable, Poor, Failing)  
 
E1. Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an overall grade on patient safety. 
 
Number of Events Reported  
 
(No event reports, 1 to 2 event reports, 3 to 5 event report, 6 to 10 event reports, 11 to 20 event reports, 21 event 
reports or more) 
 
G1. In the past 12 months, how many event reports have you filled out and submitted? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Negatively worded questions should be reverse FRGHGZKHQFDOFXODWLQJSHUFHQW³SRVLWLYH´UHVSRQVHPHDQVDQG
composites. 
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